The PARTYPRESSdataset compiles more than 250,000 published press releases from 68 parties in 9 European countries. The dataset covers the press releases of the most relevant political parties in these countries from 2010 onward. It provides a supervised machine learning classification of press releases into 21 unique issue categories according to a general codebook. The PARTYPRESS dataset can be used to study parties’ issue agendas comparatively and over time. The Partypress dataset has been compiled with the generous support of the German Research Foundation (Grants KL 2692/1-1 and KL 2692/3-1).
data access
The dataset, accompanying codebooks and citation information are published on the Harvard Dataverse. You can download the data here.
We present the PARTYPRESS Database, which compiles more than 250,000 published press releases from 68 parties in 9 European countries. The database covers the press releases of the most relevant political parties in these countries from 2010 onward. It provides a supervised machine learning classification of press releases into 21 unique issue categories according to a general codebook. The PARTYPRESS Database can be used to study parties’ issue agendas comparatively and over time. We extend a recent analysis in Gessler and Hunger (2022) to illustrate the usefulness of the database in studying dynamic party competition, communication, and behavior.
COALITIONAGREE
The COALITIONAGREEdataset maps the content of 229 coalition agreements that have been negotiated by 189 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. Our dataset is not only much more comprehensive than previous datasets, but most importantly, we also provide the first content analysis that allows for studying which policies are settled in coalition agreements. The dataset is based on a comprehensive content analysis of coalition treaties that draws on human coders to analyze the content of coalition agreements and can be easily linked to existing datasets on the content of election manifestos (e.g. Manifestos Project) and on parties, elections and cabinets (e.g. the ParlGov or ERDDA datasets). The COALITIONAGREE dataset has been compiled with the generous support of the German Research Foundation (Grants KL 2692/1-1 and KL 2692/3-1).
data access
The dataset, accompanying codebooks and citation information are published on the Harvard Dataverse. You can download the data here.
Radical right parties (RRPs) have gained representation in parliaments across Europe, but little is known about their impact on government policy. Even though RRPs tend to end up in opposition, they have considerable influence on policy making within coalition governments. One expectation is that coalition governments are tough on immigration to optimise voter support when being exposed to right-wing parties in parliament. Coalition negotiations temporarily reduce accountability and allow cabinets to adjust policy positions without bearing the costs associated with opportunistic behaviour. This argument is tested using novel data on pre-electoral policy positions and post-electoral immigration policies for coalition cabinets in 24 European democracies from 1980 to 2015. The findings reveal that governments shift to more restrictive immigration policies in face of RRPs. This article expands on prior research on the influence of the radical right by demonstrating its direct influence on coalition governments’ joint immigration policy plans.
2023
Coalition Agreements as Control Devices: Coalition Governance in Western and Eastern Europe
Many coalition cabinets negotiate lengthy coalition contracts outlining the agenda for the time in office. Not only does negotiating these agreements take up time and resources, but compromises have to be made, which may result in cabinet conflicts and electoral costs. This book explores why political parties negotiate such agreements, and argues that coalition agreements are important control devices that allow coalition parties to keep their partners in line. The authors show that their use varies with the preference configuration in cabinet and the allocation of ministerial portfolios
2019
Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance
Why do coalition parties settle some policy issues in great detail, whereas other issues are hardly mentioned in coalition agreements? Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policy making during the legislative term. However, we know remarkably little about their content. We shed light on why issue attention in coalition agreements varies so extensively. We argue that intra-cabinet conflict positively affects issue attention as parties have stronger incentives to negotiate a detailed policy agenda that constrains their coalition partners. However, we expect that this effect is conditioned by preference tangentiality and the salience of an issue among coalition partners. Our theoretical expectations are tested drawing on a new data set based on a comprehensive content analysis of 224 agreements negotiated by 181 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. We find support for our hypotheses and conclude that parties draft agreements to limit “ministerial drift.”
LOBBYLIST
The LOBBYLISTdataset contains all the interest groups that registered at the German Bundestag from 1974 until 2014. On 21 September 1972, the Bundestag adopted a law that obliges all interest groups that lobby the Bundestag to officially register. The first register was published in 1974 and the Bundestag has released annual lobbying registers ever since. All interest groups have to provide informStoetzeration about the interest they represent, their members, their leadership structure, their affiliated organizations and their contact details. Interest groups can only enter the Bundestag and participate in hearings or consultations if they are officially registered. The Bundestag lobbying register thus provides a worldwide unique data source to study interest group activity over time. In a research project generously funded by the British Academy (Grant SG111433) and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation (Grant Az. 10.13.2.109) awarded to Heike Klüver, Heike Klüver and Elisabeth Zeidler have compiled a longitudinal dataset based on the yearly lobby lists. The dataset covers all registered interest groups, their members, their organizational structure, the policy areas and economic sections in which they are active coded based on the Policy Agendas Codebook and the ISIC Classification.
data access
The dataset, accompanying codebooks and citation information are published on the Harvard Dataverse. You can download the data here.
Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.
2019
Explaining Interest Group Density Across Economic Sectors: Evidence from Germany
Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? Interest groups are an important channel through which companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-makers. However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies considerably across sectors. We argue that the size and the wealth of the potential constituency as well as government activity positively affect interest group density. We test our theoretical expectations based on an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of interest groups that registered at the German Bundestag from 1978 until 2013 and show that the number of firms, the wealth of an economic sector, and government activity positively influence interest group density. However, we also find that the relationship between interest groups and legislative activity is reciprocal as legislative activity positively impacts the number of interest groups in an economic sector, but at the same time interest group density also positively affects legislative activity.
2015
Interest Groups in the German Bundestag: Exploring the Issue Linkage Between Citizens and Interest Groups
Coalition Agreements as Control Devices: Coalition Governance in Western and Eastern EuropeMay 2023
Interest Groups in the German Bundestag: Exploring the Issue Linkage Between Citizens and Interest GroupsGerman Politics, Apr 2015